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INTRODUCTION
It has now been two decades since the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) Ministerial Conference adopted the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha Declaration” or “Declaration”)
in Doha, Qatar, on November 14, 2001.1 Through this Declaration, WTO
Members set out their understanding of the relationship between the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS Agreement” or “the Agreement”) and global health; recognized the
existence of certain “flexibilities” in the TRIPS Agreement; and identified a
“problem” that they believed merited “an expeditious solution.”2
Of course, the twentieth anniversary of the Doha Declaration occurs in
the midst of the COVID-19 global pandemic and at a time when WTO
Members, including through the WTO TRIPS Council, have been
considering the relationship between intellectual property (IP) protection and
global health more intensely than they have since negotiating the Doha
Declaration itself.3 Many WTO Members have emphasized the important
1
See, e.g., World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
2
Id. ¶ 6.
3
See, e.g., TRIPS Council Agrees to Continue Discussions on IP Responses to COVID19, WTO: 2021 NEWS ITEMS (July 20, 2021), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news21_e/trip_20jul21_e.htm (noting that “[w]hile delegations remain committed to the
common goal of providing timely and secure access to high-quality, safe, efficacious and
affordable vaccines and medicines for all, disagreement persisted on the fundamental question
of what is the appropriate and most effective way to address the shortage and inequitable
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role that IP rights have played in the rapid development and availability of
COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics. But other WTO Members, along with
certain NGOs and academics, have used the global pandemic as an
opportunity to call for a reduction in global IP protection and increased use
of compulsory licenses—i.e., licenses to patents issued by a government to
third parties without the consent of the right holders—beyond what is
permitted by the TRIPS Agreement (as amended, in line with the Doha
Declaration).
In the twenty years since its adoption, certain elements of the Doha
Declaration have been the subject of both tremendous praise and significant
criticism. As the debate raged on, WTO Members moved forward to formally
implement a key aspect of the Doha Declaration. Namely, as detailed below,
to address the “problem” that Paragraph 6 of the Declaration required “an
expeditious solution”—i.e., the practical limitations of compulsory licensing
for WTO Members with “insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector”4—the WTO General Council adopted a decision in
August 2003 (“August 2003 Decision”) that waived certain requirements of
the TRIPS Agreement, subject to fulfilment of a number of important
preconditions and safeguards.5 The Members ultimately agreed to amend the
TRIPS Agreement, itself, to make that change permanent.6
I.

SUMMARY
This article begins (in Section II) with a review of the language of the
Doha Declaration, including in view of subsequent statements and
developments clarifying WTO Members’ understanding of its terms. A
proper reading of the Doha Declaration reveals that it is meant to reaffirm the
rights and obligations already provided by the TRIPS Agreement, and that it
does not provide new exceptions to TRIPS Agreement obligations. In
referring back to the object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, the
Declaration reaffirms that the TRIPS Agreement balances the interests of
innovators with those of potential users of their innovations, including with
respect to medicines. While listing a number of built-in “flexibilities,” the
Doha Declaration emphasizes that they can be applied only “while
maintaining [the] commitments in the TRIPS Agreement.” Further, the Doha
Declaration provided a few specific instructions to WTO Members. The
direction in Paragraph 6, in particular, ultimately led WTO Members to
amend the TRIPS Agreement to address the concern that “WTO members
access to vaccines and other COVID-related products”).
4
Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 6.
5
WTO, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health (Sept. 1, 2003) WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004) [hereinafter
August 2003 Decision].
6
Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641
(Dec. 8, 2005), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm.
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with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under
the TRIPS Agreement.”
With respect to the legal status of the Doha Declaration within the WTO
system, it is intended to be only a legally non-binding statement of intent,
and lacks the characteristics of a “subsequent agreement” within the meaning
of Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna
Convention”). While the WTO dispute settlement panel in Australia—
Tobacco Plain Packaging took the view that at least one aspect of the Doha
Declaration should be considered a subsequent agreement, the WTO
Appellate Body failed to endorse that view. Contemporaneous statements by
several key WTO Members help to confirm that the Doha Declaration did
not, itself, modify obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.
Next, this article (in Section III) considers the formal decisions,
including the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, taken by the WTO in line
with the Doha Declaration, including Paragraph 6 thereof. Through an
August 2003 Decision of the WTO General Council, WTO Members opted
to waive certain existing obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, including
the limitation on compulsory licensing for exports to countries that cannot
manufacture necessary pharmaceutical products themselves (subject to
several conditions). With particular respect to the waiver of the requirement
in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, the August 2003 Decision permits
an exporting Member to grant a compulsory license “to the extent necessary
for the purpose of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export
to an eligible importing Member(s).” In order to take advantage of this
waiver, however, the exporting and importing WTO Members must satisfy
several requirements that would provide notice to other WTO Members and
serve to limit the risk that the exported products will be improperly diverted.
As clarified by the then-Chairperson of the WTO General Council, the
August Decision must not be used as a means to broadly limit patent
protection, and the benefits that naturally flow from such protection, or of
subverting the disciplines of the TRIPS Agreement. In December 2005,
WTO Members agreed that the key aspects of the August 2003 Decision
should be permanently incorporated into an amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement, upon acceptance of two-thirds of WTO Members. The
amendment was formally accepted in January 2017.
After first recalling that the exceptions in the TRIPS Agreement are
limited and finite, Section IV explores WTO Members’ recent experience
with recourse to compulsory licensing—including, e.g., the class of
compulsory licenses permitted pursuant to the amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement and the August 2003 WTO General Council Decision. In fact, the
experience with the system created by the August 2003 Decision, and later
by the amendment, has been one of limited use. The limited recourse to that
system (including to export HIV/AIDS medicines from Canada to Rwanda
under compulsory license), as well as the limited use of compulsory licensing
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generally, tends to demonstrate that compulsory licensing of any kind is often
a deeply flawed means to the critically important end of increasing access to
medicines, even if such licenses are issued in accordance with the TRIPS
Agreement. As several WTO Members have argued, the limited use is not
surprising given that the vast majority of essential medicines are not patented,
and that developing countries may acquire medicines through voluntary
licenses for those that do benefit from IP protection. In some cases, as found
in a recent study sponsored by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”), compulsory licenses may be counterproductive in the short term,
as they can result in higher prices than what may be charged through
voluntary licensing and international procurement. Further, they may also be
counterproductive in the long term: when a WTO Member abuses its power
to compulsory license, or to threaten to issue compulsory licenses, such abuse
serves to lower the overall credibility of that country’s patent system, and the
incentives for innovation that its IP regime may create. This ultimately would
be expected to limit development of new medicines and, in turn, access.
Section V then turns to consider the lessons learned from the experience
of WTO Members implementing and evaluating the Doha Declaration over
the past two decades, and the relevance of those lessons to today’s debate
over the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the development
and distribution of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics. In particular, the
innovations supported, incentivized, and licensed as a consequence of strong
global IP protection, as reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration, have saved
millions of lives around the globe. For example, the history of the
development of both the Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna vaccines, is one that
solidifies the importance of IP protection for development of innovative
products that advance public health, and for fostering the voluntary
collaborations facilitated by that protection.
Section V recalls the numerous barriers to access to COVID-19
therapeutics and vaccines that are not related to IP rights, many of which
were previously recognized at the time of adoption of the Doha Declaration.
Such barriers are often obscured during policy debates over IP rights. Finally,
Section V criticizes a proposal by several academics to establish a global
mass compulsory licensing mechanism covering all COVID-19-related
technologies and related clinical test data; this proposal appears to be deeply
flawed and would serve to detract from the goals of eradicating the COVID19 virus and treating those who are infected.
Section VI concludes, urging that, as they did twenty years ago when
adopting the Doha Declaration, WTO Members must today continue to
acknowledge the benefits of IP protection for global health, while finding
ways to maximize access to the technologies incentivized by such protection,
without leaving the world unprepared for the next pandemic.
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II. INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE DOHA
DECLARATION
Adopted by the WTO Ministerial Conference in 2001, the Doha
Declaration recognized the serious global health issues facing the world—
including developing and least developed countries (“LDCs”)7—at that time.
It set out WTO Members’ views on the relationship between those health
issues and the protection of IP rights required by the TRIPS Agreement.8 This
section first closely examines the language of the Doha Declaration and its
meaning (subsection A), and then considers the legal status of the Doha
Declaration in the WTO legal system (subsection B).
A. Interpretation
The Doha Declaration begins with (i) several general statements
regarding developments in global health, and the relationship between IP and
the creation of and access to medicines to address those developments. It then
includes (ii) a reaffirmation of several principles already in the TRIPS
Agreement, and (iii) instructions directing WTO Members to take two
specific types of new actions.
1. Paragraph 1
With respect to the general statements, the Doha Declaration begins, in
Paragraph 1, by recognizing “the gravity of the public health problems
afflicting many developing and least developed countries,” and specifically
refers to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and “other epidemics.”9
The ordinary meaning of the term “epidemic” (as a noun) is “epidemic
disease,” with “epidemic” (as an adjective) defined as “[p]revalent among a
people or a community at a special time, and produced by some special
causes not generally present in the affected locality.”10 Notably, all of the
conditions referenced in this paragraph are those that can be passed on from
person to person within a community. As a “pandemic” is a type of
“epidemic” with similar characteristics to some of the conditions listed in
Paragraph 1, this provision would appear to be broad enough to cover
COVID-19.11
7
The WTO recognizes as LDCs those forty-nine countries designated by the United
Nations, thirty of which are WTO Members: Angola; Bangladesh; Benin; Burkina Faso;
Burundi; Central African Republic; Chad; Congo, Democratic Republic of the; Djibouti;
Gambia; Guinea; Guinea Bissau; Haiti; Lesotho; Madagascar; Malawi; Maldives; Mali;
Mauritania; Mozambique; Myanmar; Niger; Rwanda; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Solomon
Islands; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Zambia. See WTO, Briefing Notes, Towards Free Market
Access for Least-Developed Countries, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min01_e/brief_e/brief03_e.htm.
8
See Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 4.
9
Id. ¶ 1.
10 Epidemic, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
11 A “pandemic” is defined as a type of epidemic, namely an “epidemic over a very large
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While the scope of the Declaration is not explicitly limited to the types
of epidemics listed in Paragraph 1, this provision provides relevant context
to understand the type of health problems that Members intended to address.
2. Paragraph 2
The Declaration turns, in Paragraph 2, to the TRIPS Agreement, and
“stress[es] the need for” it “to be part of the wider national and international
action to address these problems,” namely, the public health problems
referenced in Paragraph 1.12 This begs the question of how a treaty like the
TRIPS Agreement can be part of the “action” to address health problems.
The WTO Members attempt to answer that question in the subsequent
paragraphs.
3. Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3 of the Doha Declaration makes the critically important
point that “intellectual property protection is important for the development
of new medicines.”13 As applied to the specific context of medicines, this is
fully consistent with Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which acknowledges
that “protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation.”14
Through Paragraph 3 of the Doha Declaration, WTO Members also
“recognize the concerns about [IP protection’s] effect on prices.”15 This
clause implicitly links IP rights with the ability of right holders to charge
higher prices for products covered by those IP rights in order to, e.g., recoup
the tremendous cost of research and development (“R&D”) required to
develop and test those products. That said, as discussed further below, it is
important to note that the price of pharmaceutical products is impacted by a
multitude of factors, including, inter alia, technical barriers to trade, timeconsuming and costly domestic regulatory frameworks, costs of internal
distribution within a given country, taxes, and tariffs.16
Again, the relationship between IP rights and access to the results of the
area; affecting a large proportion of a population.” Pandemic, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
ONLINE (last visited Oct. 25, 2021). In March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO)
first indicated that COVID-19 was to be classified as a pandemic. See Director General’s
Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19, WHO (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-openingremarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020.
12 Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 2.
13 Id. ¶ 3.
14 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 7, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
15 Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 3.
16 See infra Section V.B.
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innovation that they incentivize is also covered by Article 7 of the TRIPS
Agreement, which refers to the “mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”17
4. Paragraph 4
Turning to the principles, perhaps the most quoted portion of the Doha
Declaration is Paragraph 4, which states the agreement of WTO Members:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
Members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly,
while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in
a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO members to use to
the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide
flexibility.18

This provision makes it clear that, rather than, itself, adding any
flexibilities, the Doha Declaration is only a “reaffirm[ation]” of rights
already understood to be provided by the TRIPS Agreement.19 The references
to what the TRIPS Agreement “does not and should not” prevent Members
from doing, and the way in which the TRIPS Agreement “can and should”
be interpreted and implemented, also indicate that the provision is a statement
of what the TRIPS Agreement does in its current state, and without any need
for change (subject to the action item in Paragraph 6). This understanding is
solidified by the introductory text of Paragraph 5 (before listing of the
“flexibilities”), which provides that such flexibilities can be applied only
“while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement.”20
The Trilateral WTO/WHO/WIPO Report on Promoting Access to
Medical Technologies and Innovation (“Trilateral Study”) reflects the same
understanding, stating that the Doha Declaration “referred to,” “highlights,”
“confirms,” and “lists” existing aspects of the TRIPS Agreement.21
In contrast, a paper published by the UN Development Programme (coauthored by Correa & Matthews) has argued that Paragraph 4 of the Doha
Declaration somehow provides that “governments not only may but also have
17

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 7 (emphasis added).
Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
19 See generally Eric M. Solovy & Pavan Krishnamurthy, TRIPS Agreement Flexibilities
and Their Limitations: A Response to the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report
on Access to Medicines, 50 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 69, 91-96 (2017).
20 Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
21 WTO, WIPO, & WHO, PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND
INNOVATION 91, 93 (2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter Trilateral Study].
18
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the duty to use the TRIPS flexibilities.”22 But such an interpretation would
go against a fundamental principle of the TRIPS Agreement, as set out in
Article 1.1, that Members “may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in
their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement.”23
Had the WTO Members intended to modify that provision through the Doha
Declaration, they would have specifically indicated as such and subsequently
moved to amend the TRIPS Agreement accordingly. Article 1.1 clarifies that
the TRIPS Agreement sets the minimum level of protection that WTO
Members must meet, and that they have the discretion to provide greater
levels of protection. For example, it is up to a WTO Member to determine
whether or not it wishes to take advantage of a particular exception (or
“flexibility”) in the TRIPS Agreement, and whether it will provide a higher
level of protection for one or more types of IP rights (as long as such
additional protection does not violate other provisions of the Agreement).
The South Centre (an NGO that often advocates for decreased global IP
protection) has characterized Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration as
providing “for a clear rule of interpretation . . . such that any measure that is
necessary to protect public health cannot be held to violate the provisions of
TRIPS . . . even when the measure derogates from certain obligations under
the TRIPS Agreement.”24 In other words, this NGO reads the Doha
Declaration as providing that any measure deemed “necessary to protect
public health” is exempted from discipline by the TRIPS Agreement. There
is nothing in Paragraph 4, or anywhere else in the Doha Declaration, that
would justify such an extraordinary reading. And there would have been no
need for WTO Members to act on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration,
through ultimately amending the TRIPS Agreement, had the Doha
Declaration somehow created such a broad public health exception for IP
protection.
There is likewise no support for the proposition advanced by some,
including the Government of India, that the Doha Declaration signifies that
“public health concerns overrode intellectual property rights.”25 In reality,
the Declaration reaffirmed that the TRIPS Agreement already balances the
interests of innovators with the interests of potential users of their
innovations, including with respect to medicines.
22 CARLOS CORREA & DUNCAN MATTHEWS, THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, THE DOHA DECLARATION TEN YEARS ON AND ITS IMPACT ON ACCESS TO
MEDICINES AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 17 (Dec. 20, 2011).
23 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.1.
24 SOUTH CENTRE, SOUTH CENTRE POLICY BRIEF NO. 7, THE DOHA DECLARATION ON
TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH TEN YEARS LATER: THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION 4 (2011),
https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PB7_-Doha-Declaration-on-TRIPS
-and-Health_-EN.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter SOUTH CENTRE POLICY BRIEF NO. 7].
25 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annual Review of
the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 66, WTO Doc. IP/C/57 (Dec. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Annual
Review of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6].
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5. Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration goes on to “recognize” four
different types of “flexibilities” that are already available in the TRIPS
Agreement.
First, Paragraph 5(a) recognizes the fact that, “[i]n applying the
customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision
of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose
of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and
principles.”26
This sub-paragraph effectively mimics (and, in significant part, copies
word-for-word) the last clause of the customary rule of international law as
codified in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.27 That article provides
that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose.”28 The specific reference in the Doha
Declaration to the “object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in
particular, in its objectives and principles” is a reference to Article 7 of the
TRIPS Agreement (entitled “Objectives”) and Article 8 (entitled
“Principles”).
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights
and obligations.29

As explained by Solovy and Krishnamurthy:
Article 7 clarifies the intent of the drafters to “balance”—to the
“mutual advantage” of producers and users—the need to establish
incentives for creation and promotion of new technology, without
unduly restricting the dissemination of that technology once created.
Thus, the very essence of the innovation-access debate is crystallized
in the terms of Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, itself, with WTO
Members urged to find “balance.” That “balance” is currently
reflected in the TRIPS Agreement, with its combination of obligations
and exceptions.30

26

Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 5(a).
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
28 Id. (emphasis added).
29 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 7.
30 Solovy & Krishnamurthy, supra note 19, at 90.
27
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Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement states, “Members may, in
formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement.”31
The text of Article 8.1 makes it crystal clear that it does not provide an
“exception” to the TRIPS Agreement for measures that aim “to
protect public health and nutrition” or “to promote the public interest.”32
Rather, pursuant to its final clause, any such measures must be “consistent
with the provision of [the TRIPS] Agreement.”33 Indeed, the use of the word
“necessary” in the phrase “necessary to protect public health and nutrition”
indicates that it is relevant to consider whether a measure aimed at protecting
public health is actually capable of achieving that objective.34
Sub-paragraphs 5(b) and (c) of the Doha Declaration relate to Article 31
of the TRIPS Agreement, entitled “Other Use Without Authorization of the
Right Holder,” which permits governments to issue compulsory licenses of
patents, subject to a number of conditions. Article 31 contains twelve
different paragraphs setting out the conditions to be followed when issuing a
compulsory license; these conditions are then supplemented by Article 31bis.
Article 31 contains “by far, the longest list of specific considerations for any
single limitation or exception to substantive IP rights in the TRIPS
Agreement.”35 Among the conditions is a requirement in Article 31(b) to
make efforts for a reasonable period of time to “obtain authorization from the
right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions.”36 Further, “the
scope and duration” of the compulsory license “shall be limited to the
purpose for which it was authorized,”37 and authorization for a compulsory
license must terminate when the circumstances leading to its issuance “cease
to exist and are unlikely to occur.”38 There is also a requirement for “adequate
31

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 8.1.
Id.
33 Id.
34 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, ¶ 151, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) (finding that an import
ban of used tires was not necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health because it
was not “apt to produce a material contribution to the achievement of its objective” of reducing
disease and environmental harm); Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 165, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R
(adopted Jan. 10, 2001) (finding that a measure is not “necessary” within the meaning of
GATT Article XX(b) “if an alternative measure which [a Member] could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to
it”).
35 Solovy & Krishnamurthy, supra note 19, at 120.
36 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(b).
37 Id. art. 31(c).
38 Id. art. 31(g).
32
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remuneration” to the right holder to compensate for the compulsory license.39
Any compulsory license “shall be considered on its individual merits,” and
should be “non-exclusive,” as well as generally “non-assignable.”40
Subparagraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration reaffirms that each Member
“has the right to grant compulsory licences.”41 This principle is already
established by Article 31, itself. Subparagraph 5(b) then goes on to recall that
Members likewise have “the freedom to determine the grounds upon which
such licences are granted,” which again appears to implicitly recall that
Article 31 does not include a specific list of acceptable grounds for
compulsory licensing.42 However, given the multiple conditions in Article 31
and the overall object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement (as set out in
Articles 7 and 8, discussed above), Article 31 must be understood as
providing only a limited exception to the exclusive rights accorded pursuant
to Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Next, subparagraph 5(c) provides that each Member “has the right to
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including
those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.”43 The list of diseases here mimics that which is first found in
Paragraph 1 of the Declaration. The reference to “national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency” relates specifically to Article 31(b)
of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that, in such circumstances, a
Member need not require (as a prerequisite to issuing a compulsory license)
that the recipient of the license “has made efforts to obtain authorization from
the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and condition,” and that
such efforts “have not been successful within a reasonable period of time.”44
Subparagraph 5(d) provides that the effect of the TRIPS Agreement is
that each WTO Member is “free to establish its own regime for . . . exhaustion
[of IP rights] without challenge, subject to the MFN and national treatment
provisions of Article 3 and 4 [of the TRIPS Agreement].”45 This is essentially
a restatement of Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, which provides that
WTO dispute settlement shall not be “used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights” other than Articles 3 and 4
thereof.46 IP exhaustion is a term used to address the question of when, after
a patented product has first been lawfully sold, the patent holder’s rights to
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
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Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 5(d).
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prevent further sale of that product expire.47 Exhaustion can be delimited at
the national, international, or regional level, or a combination thereof.48 If a
given country adopts a policy of international exhaustion, for example, it may
consider that the first sale of a product by a patent owner (or a person
authorized by the patent owner) anywhere in the world terminates the patent
owner’s rights over the patented product in that country, such that the patent
owner could not stop the import of that product into that country (known as
“parallel imports”).49 A system of domestic exhaustion (which lacks
international exhaustion), however, would provide a patent owner the right
to prevent such parallel imports as part of the core patent right required under
Article 28.1 of the TRIPS Agreement (which specifically requires that
Members provide the right to prevent unauthorized third parties from
“importing” a patented product).
Importantly, all of the flexibilities described above are subject to the
caveat, included in the chapeau to Paragraph 5, that they can be applied only
“while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement.”50 Consistent
with this interpretation, the Trilateral Study refers to each of the
subparagraphs of Paragraph 5 as providing either “clarifications” or
“confirm[ations].”51
6. Paragraph 6
Turning now to the specific instructions provided to WTO Members in
the Doha Declaration, Paragraph 6 “recognize[s] that WTO members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under
the TRIPS Agreement” and instructs the TRIPS Council to find “an
expeditious solution to this problem.”52 This paragraph implicitly refers to
the requirement in TRIPS Article 31(f) that any compulsory licensing “shall
be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the
Member authorizing such use.”53 As detailed in Section III, below, this
directive led to the August 2003 WTO General Council Decision and
47 WTO Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents, Obligations and exceptions,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm (last visited July 17,
2022); WIPO Secretariat, Interface Between Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Law, CDIP/4/4 Rev./Sutdy/Inf/2, at 4-5 (June 1, 2001), https://www.wipo.int/
edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4rev_study_inf_2.pdf (last visited July 17, 2022).
48 WIPO Secretariat, Interface Between Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and
Competition Law, CDIP/4/4 Rev./Sutdy/Inf/2, at 4-5 (June 1, 2001), https://www.wipo.
int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4rev_study_inf_2.pdf (last visited July 17, 2022).
49 Parallel
imports, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/
parallel_imports_e.htm (last visited July 17, 2022).
50 Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
51 Trilateral Study, supra note 21, at 93.
52 Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 6.
53 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31(f).
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eventually the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, i.e., Article 31bis.
7. Paragraph 7
Through Paragraph 7, the Doha Declaration directed the TRIPS Council
to extend the transition period that LDC WTO Members were initially
provided to “implement or apply Sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS
Agreement” (i.e., covering patents and undisclosed information) with respect
to pharmaceutical products, or to enforce the rights provided for under those
Sections.54 In doing so, Paragraph 7 referenced the transition period for LDCs
originally included in Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement (which had
begun with a 10 year transition period).
In fact, WTO Members followed the instruction to extend this transition
period, with the most recent extension available for LDCs through “1 January
2033, or until such a date on which they cease to be a least developed country
Member, whichever date is earlier.”55
Importantly, Paragraph 7 also refers back to another provision in the
TRIPS Agreement specifically focused on LDCs, i.e., Article 66.2.
Article 66.2 provides that developed-country WTO Members “shall provide
incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of
promoting and encouraging technology transfer” to LDCs, with the aim of
enabling them to “create a sound and viable technological base.”56 This
provision in the TRIPS Agreement, and its reaffirmation in the Doha
Declaration, is an important reminder of the potential for IP protection to
enable LDCs to grow their own technology bases and, in turn, their
economies.
Before enterprises and institutions in developed countries can be
comfortable transferring such technology to developing countries, however,
they must be provided some assurance that the technology covered by IP
rights will be protected. In a June 2002 communication discussing the
relationship between trade and technology transfer (pursuant to paragraph 37
of the Doha Ministerial Declaration57), the European Union emphasized this
point, stating:
Where the technology in question is subject to intellectual property
rights, the transfer of this technology implies transfer of the legal
rights to the technology in question by selling patent rights or
54

Doha Declaration, supra note 1, ¶ 7.
See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the
Transition Period under Article: 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed Country
Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. No.
IP/C/73 (Nov. 6, 2015).
56 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 66.2.
57 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001, ¶ 37,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/
min01_e/mindecl_e.htm.
55
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licensing the right to make use of the right. Know-how and skills
linked to the licensed technology will normally become available
through the learning process of the licensee country, and might be
facilitated where the licensing is linked to investment, e.g. in the form
of a joint venture.
The decision to license in a given country is that of the right-holder
and forms part of the right-holder’s business strategy or, in the event
of a non-profit organisation holding the right, its objectives. The
existence and enforcement of an IPR system in the recipient country
is often a prerequisite and the confidence of the right-owner in that
system is a key element.58

Likewise, in negotiating Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement (covering
protection of undisclosed information, including trade secrets) back in 1989,
the United States made this same point, with the U.S. representative to the
negotiations stating that trade secret protection is “important for developing
countries since there was no better way of encouraging the transfer of
technology to developing countries than to provide protection to trade secrets
and proprietary information which constituted the very essence of the transfer
of technology.”59
B. Legal Status
As explained by Solovy and Krishnamurthy, the text and negotiating
history of the Doha Declaration indicate that it was intended to be a legally
non-binding statement of intent.60 In the WTO system, this type of
declaration is not considered an authoritative interpretation, within the
meaning of Article IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO
(“the Marrakesh Agreement”), which provides a particular method for
establishing such an interpretation.61
58 Communication from the European Communities, Trade and Transfer of Technology,
Work of the Working Group Under the Auspices of the General Council Pursuant to
Paragraph 37 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/WGTTT/1 (Jun. 10, 2002),
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&Catalogue
IdList=97491,70866,2909,1541,15753,42543,24924,102138,47494,32863&Current
CatalogueIdIndex=8&FullTextHash=&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord=True&
HasSpanishRecord=True (emphasis added).
59 Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 30 October—2 November 1989,
22, MTN.GNG/NG11/16 (Dec. 4, 1989).
60 See Solovy & Krishnamurthy, supra note 19, at 92.
61 See Thomas Cottier, The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS
1041, 1077 (Patrick F. J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton & Michael G. Plummer eds. 2005). See
also Carlos M. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health 44, Health Economics and Drugs EDM Series, No. 12, WHO/EDM/PAR/
2002.3 (June 2002) (noting that the Doha Declaration “has no specific legal status in the
framework of WTO Law; it is not strictly an authoritative interpretation in terms of Article
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In 2018, for the first time, a WTO dispute settlement panel interpreted
an aspect of the Doha Declaration. Specifically, the WTO panel in
Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging considered Paragraph 5 of the Doha
Declaration (i.e., recognizing the “flexibilities” in the TRIPS Agreement) to
be a “‘subsequent agreement’ of WTO Members, within the meaning of
Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.”62 In interpreting a treaty, Article
31(3) of the Vienna Convention allows for consideration of, along with
context, inter alia: “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.”63 As noted
by the Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging panel, the WTO Appellate Body
had previously clarified that:
a decision adopted by Members may qualify as a “subsequent
agreement between the parties” regarding the interpretation of a
covered agreement or the application of its provisions if: (i) the
decision is, in a temporal sense, adopted subsequent to the relevant
covered agreement; and (ii) the terms and content of the decision
express an agreement between Members on the interpretation or
application of a provision of WTO law.64

On appeal of the Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging panel report, the
Appellate Body avoided endorsing that panel’s observations regarding
Paragraph 5 (or any other aspect) of the Doha Declaration. With particular
respect to Paragraph 5(a), the Appellate Body (like the panel before it) noted
that the statement, “each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in
the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in
particular, in its objectives and principles” “reflects” the applicable rules of
interpretation under customary international law.65 The Appellate Body
merely (and unsurprisingly) agreed with the panel’s recourse to the “general
principle of treaty interpretation” when interpreting the TRIPS Agreement,

IX:2 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO”).
62 Panel Report, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and
Packaging, ¶ 7.2409, WTO Doc. WT/DS441/R (adopted June 29, 2020) [hereinafter Panel
Report, Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging] (as upheld by Appellate Body Report,
Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Appellate Body Report, Australia—Tobacco Plain
Packaging Trademarks, Geographical Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements
Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO Doc. WT/DS441/AB/R (adopted June
29, 2020) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging]).
63 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 27, art. 31(3)(a); see also
International Law Commission, Commentary on the Draft Vienna Convention, in Y.B. OF THE
INT’L L. COMM’N Vol. II 118 (1966).
64 Panel Report, Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, supra note 62, ¶ 7.2409 (quoting
Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove
Cigarettes, ¶ 262, WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 24, 2012)).
65 Appellate Body Report, Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, supra note 62, ¶ 6.657.
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“regardless of the legal status of the Doha Declaration.”66 Thus, the Appellate
Body did not express any opinion on whether Paragraph 5 of the Doha
Declaration was a “subsequent agreement.”67 Rather, the Appellate Body
minimized the panel’s reliance on (and, by implication, statement about the
legal status of) the Doha Declaration, stating that “the reliance on the Doha
Declaration was not of decisive importance for the Panel’s reasoning” and
highlighted that the “Panel relied on the Doha Declaration simply to
reconfirm its previous conclusions.”68
The correctness of the panel’s characterization is not without doubt.
According to the panel in Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, rather than
being an agreement on the meaning of any particular provision of the TRIPS
Agreement, Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration is an agreement on “the
approach to be followed in interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement.”69 As for that approach, the Doha Declaration provides (pursuant
to Paragraph 5(a)) that the TRIPS Agreement shall be interpreted in light of
its object and purpose, including as reflected in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS
Agreement. According to Gathii, this “sets an interpretive baseline that
requires balancing the interests of producers and consumers of intellectual
property rights.”70 In this regard, the “approach” set out by the Doha
Declaration is not any different from the approach that would be applied in
its absence.
The panel explained that “guidance provided by the Doha Declaration
is consistent . . . with the applicable rules of interpretation, which require a
treaty interpreter to take account of the context and object and purpose of the
treaty being interpreted.”71 Thus, it is doubtful whether the Members did
make, through the Doha Declaration, any new “agreement” concerning the
“interpretation or application” of the TRIPS Agreement, or what practical
purpose any such agreement would serve in the course of interpreting the
TRIPS Agreement.
Notably, in amending the TRIPS Agreement in accordance with the
instruction in Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, Article 31bis of the
TRIPS Agreement now includes a specific reference back to the Doha
Declaration. It provides in relevant part, at paragraph 5, that Article 31bis is
“without prejudice to the rights, obligations and flexibilities that Members
have under the provisions of this Agreement other than paragraphs (f) and
(h) of Article 31, including those reaffirmed by the Declaration on the TRIPS
66

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
68 Id. ¶ 6.658.
69 Panel Report, Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, supra note 62, ¶ 7.2410.
70 James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 292, 316
(2002).
71 Panel Report, Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, supra note 62, ¶ 7.2411.
67
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Agreement and Public Health.”72 The key phrase here is “reaffirmed by,” a
phrase that clarifies the limited legal nature and impact of the Doha
Declaration (beyond the instruction that led to the amendment, and the
instruction to extend the transition period for LDCs).
Further, based on the statements made by certain WTO Members
contemporaneous with the negotiation of the Doha Declaration, it likewise
does not appear that the Members intended it to be a “subsequent agreement”
of the parties, under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, or a
document that would otherwise add any substantive value to the TRIPS
Agreement. In this case, several WTO Members, including the United States,
European Communities (now the European Union) and Switzerland,
objected to the idea of the Doha Declaration having the status of something
that could alter the TRIPS Agreement.73 For example, in its “Fact Sheet
Summarizing Results from WTO Doha Meeting,” the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) referred to the Doha Declaration as a
“political Declaration regarding patent rules and public health” that
“highlights provisions in the TRIPS agreement that provide Members with
the flexibility to address public health emergencies” and expresses “strong
support for the TRIPS agreement and the importance of Intellectual Property
Protection for the development of life saving drugs.”74
On November 10, 2001, just four days before the adoption of the Doha
Declaration, the United States issued a background paper on “TRIPs and
Health Emergencies” that made the following points:
•

We support clarifying
Agreement. . . .

the

flexibility

in

the

TRIPs

•

The United States opposes a declaration that creates a broad
carve-out to TRIPs ostensibly to ‘protect public health.’ Instead
of permitting targeted exceptions to TRIPs, [the pending] openended language would result in commonplace erosion of patent
protections—from pharmaceuticals to medical software—and
thwart research into medicines to treat life-threatening diseases.

72 World Trade Organization, Article 31bis of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 1.1, ¶ 5 (emphasis added), https://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/trips_art31_bis_oth.pdf.
73 See, e.g., Gathii, supra note 70, at 315 (“The United States has maintained that Doha
was a political declaration with no legal authority. The United States Trade Representative’s
Fact Sheet summarizing the results of the Doha meeting refers to the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health as a political declaration. From this perspective, the Declaration is
not a fait accompli for countries seeking to facilitate access to essential medicines. Rather, it
is an implicit reciprocation by the West to developing countries for their implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement and their acquiescence to a new round of WTO talks.”).
74 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet Summarizing Results from
WTO Doha Meeting (Nov. 14, 2001) (emphasis added). See also Press Release, Office of the
United States Trade Representative, USTR Zoellick Says World Has Chosen Path of Hope,
Openness, Development and Growth (Nov. 14, 2001).
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Indeed, it could subvert the entire TRIPs Agreement.75

Thus, there was certainly no common view among WTO Members that
the Doha Declaration was, itself, doing anything more than clarifying what
was already in the TRIPS Agreement. While the Doha Declaration also
included an agreed future work plan for the WTO TRIPS Council (through
paragraphs 6 and 7), those provisions do not “express an agreement between
Members on the interpretation or application of a provision of WTO law,”
and thus would not be considered a “subsequent agreement” within the
meaning of Article 31(3)(a) the Vienna Convention.76 To the extent other
aspects of the Doha Declaration are considered a “subsequent agreement”
with respect to the obligations in the TRIPS Agreement, it is one that simply
confirms what could already be deduced from a proper interpretation of the
treaty text, consistent with the rules of treaty interpretation in the Vienna
Convention.
In the U.S. Government’s Special 301 Reports published subsequent to
the Doha Declaration, through which the United States reviews on an annual
basis the global state of IP protection and enforcement, the United States
reasserts its continuing understanding that WTO Members are obligated to
abide by the requirements in the TRIPS Agreement, including those
regarding issuance of compulsory licenses (as modified by the August 2003
Decision and TRIPS Article 31bis). In 2011, for example, the United States
clarified that it “respects its trading partners’ rights to grant compulsory
licenses, in a manner consistent with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement”
and strongly supported the August 2003 Decision and Article 31bis.77
In its 2018 Special 301 Report, the United States criticized several
countries for overuse of compulsory licensing (or the threat thereof), and
recalled the conditions for compulsory licensing required by the TRIPS
Agreement:
[A]ctions by trading partners to unfairly issue, threaten to issue, or
encourage others to issue, compulsory licenses raise serious concerns.
Such actions can undermine a patent holder’s IP, reduce incentives to
invest in research and development for new treatments and cures,
unfairly shift the burden for funding such research and development
to American patients and those in other markets that properly respect
IP, and discourage the introduction of important new medicines into
affected markets. To maintain the integrity and predictability of IP
systems, governments should use compulsory licenses only in
75 Press Release, United States Trade Representative, TRIPS and Health Emergencies,
USTR Background Paper (Nov. 10, 2001).
76 Panel Report, Australia—Tobacco Plain Packaging, supra note 62, ¶ 7.2409 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production
and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, supra note 64, ¶ 262).
77 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2011 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 13
(2011) (emphasis added).
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extremely limited circumstances and after making every effort to
obtain authorization from the patent owner on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions. Such licenses should not be used as a tool to
implement industrial policy, including providing advantages to
domestic companies, or as undue leverage in pricing negotiations
between governments and right holders.78

Similarly, the European Commission’s periodic Report on the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third
Countries has highlighted the need for any compulsory licensing to be
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement, pointing out concerns about
Thailand’s use of compulsory licenses for medicines.79
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA
DECLARATION
On August 30, 2003—almost two years after adoption of the Doha
Declaration, and in line with the instruction in Paragraph 6—the WTO
General Council adopted the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6
of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.80
Through this August 2003 Decision, WTO Members created a “waiver” to
certain existing obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, removing the
limitation on compulsory licensing for exports to countries that cannot
manufacture the necessary pharmaceutical products themselves (subject to
fulfilment of several conditions).81
Upon issuing the decision, the then-Chairperson of the WTO General
Council, Carlos Pérez del Castillo, issued a separate statement that was, as
summarized by the WTO Secretariat, “designed to provide comfort to those
who feared that the decision might be abused and undermine patent
78

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 14
(2018); see also OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2019 SPECIAL 301
REPORT 14, 49-51, 60, 65, 76 (2019); OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
2020 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 14, 48, 50, 52, 57, 62, 75 (2020).
79 European Commission Staff Working Document, Report on the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries, at 23 (July 1, 2015).
Considering such statements by the United States and the European Union, together with the
actions by the WTO Members being criticized, may demonstrate a lack of relevant
“subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation” with respect to compulsory licensing, within the meaning
of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention.
80 August 2003 Decision, supra note 5. See DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, 134-40, (5th ed. 2021).
81 A “waiver” is a decision adopted by WTO Members to release all or some WTO
Members from certain substantive WTO obligations which would otherwise apply, usually for
a limited period of time and subject to certain conditions. The power to grant a waiver is vested
in the Ministerial Conference of the WTO, and when the Ministerial Conference is not
meeting, in the General Council of the WTO. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization arts. IX:3, IX:4, IV:2, Apr. 15 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
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protection.”82 Mr. Pérez del Castillo characterized his statement about the
August 2003 Decision as representing “several key shared understandings of
Members regarding the Decision to be taken and the way in which it will be
interpreted and implemented.”83 Among those shared understandings,
according to Mr. Castillo, was the following:
Members recognize that the system that will be established by the
Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health and,
without prejudice to paragraph 6 of the Decision, not be an instrument
to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives.84

In other words, the August 2003 Decision should not be used as a means to
broadly limit patent protection (and the benefits that naturally flow from such
protection), or of subverting the disciplines of the TRIPS Agreement, when
evaluated in view of the object and purpose of the Agreement.
The August 2003 Decision refers to the powers of the Ministerial
Conference under Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement, and recalls the
“instruction . . . contained in paragraph 6 of the [Doha] Declaration.”85 It
states that “exceptional circumstances exist justifying waivers from the
obligations set out in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Article 31 of the TRIPS
Agreement with respect to pharmaceutical products.”86 The August 2003
Decision then releases Members from certain substantive obligations under
those paragraphs, and sets forth the detailed conditions and safeguards with
which actions benefitting from the waiver must comply.
With respect to the waiver of the requirement in Article 31(f) of the
TRIPS Agreement, the August 2003 Decision provides for the ability of an
exporting Member to grant a compulsory license “to the extent necessary for
the purpose of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an
eligible importing Member(s)” in accordance with the terms specified in the
Decision.87 Such terms require the eligible importing Member to (i) notify
names and expected quantities of the products needed; (ii) confirm that the
eligible importing Member has established insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities for the product in question (or that it is an LDC), consistent with
the Annex to the August 2003 Decision; and (iii) confirm that a compulsory
82

World Trade Organization, The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, WTO: 2003
NEWS ITEMS (Aug. 30, 2003), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_
28aug03_e.htm [hereinafter The General Council Chairperson’s Statement].
83 Id.
84 Id. (emphasis added).
85 August 2003 Decision, supra note 5, at Preamble.
86 Id. For purposes of the August 2003 Decision, a pharmaceutical product is defined as
“any patented product, or product manufactured through a patented process, of the
pharmaceutical sector needed to address the public health problems as recognized in paragraph
1 of the Declaration. It is understood that active ingredients necessary for its manufacture and
diagnostic kits needed for its use would be included.” Id. ¶ 1.
87 Id. ¶ 2.

273

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:253 (2022)

license has been granted where the product is patented in its territory.88
Further, the compulsory license issued by the exporting Member must
(i) be limited to the amount “necessary to meet the needs of the eligible
importing Member(s)” and be for export to that Member; and (ii) be clearly
identified as being produced under the scope of the August 2003 Decision
through “specific labelling or marking,” and “special packaging and/or
special colouring/shaping of the products themselves.”89
As explained in the General Council Chairperson’s statement
accompanying the August 2003 Decision, “Members recognize that the
purpose of the Decision would be defeated if products supplied under this
Decision[s] are diverted from the markets for which they are intended.
Therefore, all reasonable measures should be taken to prevent such diversion
in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Decision.”90
In addition, the exporting Member must provide information about the
compulsory license on a website, and shall notify the TRIPS Council of the
details of the license.91
With respect to regional trade agreements (“RTAs”) in which at least
half of the membership is made up of LDCs, paragraph 6 of the August 2003
Decision provides for a waiver of the obligations in Article 31(f) with respect
to developing-country or LDC members of such RTAs “to the extent
necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product produced or imported under a
compulsory licence in that Member to be exported to the markets of those
other developing or least developed country parties to the regional trade
agreement that share the health problem in question.”92 To date, it does not
appear that any country has taken advantage of this RTA-focused aspect of
the August 2003 Decision (or of Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement).
Turning to the partial waiver of the requirement under TRIPS Article
31(h), the key point is that a patent holder need not be compensated by both
the exporting and importing Members, even when they each issue a
compulsory license on patents covering the product at issue. Pursuant to the
August 2003 Decision, adequate remuneration must be paid only in the
exporting Member, and in that case such remuneration shall take “into
account the economic value to the importing Member of the use that has been
authorized in the exporting Member.”93 In other words, this aspect of the
“waiver” applies only to the importing Member, as the right holder must still
be compensated in the exporting Member.
As noted, the August 2003 Decision includes several provisions aimed
at preventing trade diversion of the products exported pursuant to the system,
88
89
90
91
92
93

274

Id. ¶ 2(a).
Id. ¶ 2(b).
The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, supra note 82.
August 2003 Decision, supra note 5, ¶ 2.
See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 31bis(3).
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so that they ultimately are used by the people in the importing Member.94
Two years later, on December 6, 2005, WTO Members agreed that the
key aspects of the August 2003 Decision should be permanently incorporated
into an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, upon acceptance of two-thirds
of WTO Members. While several developing country Members had proposed
removing certain aspects of the August 2003 Decision from the TRIPS
amendment, particularly those directed at preventing trade diversion and
certain notification requirements, they did not succeed.95 The amendment
was formally accepted in January 2017, making permanent the flexibilities
that had been first provided in August 2003, along with the associated
safeguards and notification requirements.96
The amendment is currently found at Article 31bis of the TRIPS
Agreement, which also incorporated by reference an associated Annex and
Appendix to the TRIPS Agreement. Pursuant to its own terms, the August
2003 Decision terminates “for each Member on the date on which an
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provision takes effect for
that Member.”97 According to the WTO Secretariat, the waiver provided
pursuant to the August 2003 Decision remains in effect for the minority of
WTO Members yet to accept Article 31bis.98 As of September 1, 2020,
Article 31bis applied to 131 WTO Members, with only 33 WTO Members
not yet having accepted the amendment.99
It is important to point out that WTO obligations are not self-executing
in most domestic legal systems, and that Article 31bis (and the August 2003
Decision before it) provides only the discretion to establish a system that
would enable compulsory licensing for export, in line with the conditions set
out therein. Thus, WTO Members that intend to participate as exporters must
amend their domestic law and/or regulations before making use of this class
of compulsory license. Many countries have done so, with Norway and
Canada being among the first to notify the WTO General Council that they
had implemented the August 2003 Decision in their domestic legal
systems.100
94

Id. ¶¶ 4-5.
See GERVAIS, supra note 80, at 141.
96 See WTO, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited May 19, 2022). For details on the negotiations of the
amendment, see GERVAIS, supra note 80, at 140-46.
97 August 2013 Decision, supra note 5, ¶ 11.
98 TRIPS and Public Health, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
pharmpatent_e.htm.
99 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annual Review of
the Special Compulsory Licensing System, Report to the General Council, ¶ 11, WTO Doc.
IP/C/86 (Nov. 11, 2020) [hereinafter 2020 Annual Review of the Special Compulsory
Licensing System].
100 See GERVAIS, supra note 80, at 140 (citing World Trade Organization, Communication
from Norway, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/427 (Sept. 17, 2004)); Annual Review of the Decision
95

275

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:253 (2022)

To be clear, implementing such domestic legislation was not required
in order to sign onto the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement in the first
place. The WTO Secretariat clarified the relationship between the Protocol
amending the TRIPS Agreement and domestic law implementation,
explaining as follows:
[I]f a Member does accept the Protocol, it does not assume any legal
obligation to have in place or to put in place implementing legislation.
Effectively, the step of accepting the Protocol means that a Member
is confirming its agreement that other Members are entitled to use the
System if they so wish. Of course, it is an important step to accept the
Protocol, but essentially because it will mainly give other Members
legal certainty and confidence to use the System. If they do choose to
use the new flexibility to obtain affordable medicines, their access to
medicines by these means will thus be on a legal parity with any other
health-related flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore, it is
clear that many Members—in fact the overwhelming majority of
acceptances of the Protocol from a wide range of legal, economic,
geographic backgrounds—have accepted the Protocol without first
putting implementing legislation in place.101

According to a WTO press release issued at the time that Article 31bis
of the TRIPS Agreement entered into force (January 2017): “The bulk of
global medicine exports is covered by laws enabling exports under this
system, opening up new options for potential beneficiaries to access a wide
range of potential suppliers and enabling new, innovative procurement
strategies.”102
As detailed further below in Section IV.B, Canada was the first country
to take advantage of the August 2003 Decision, when it issued a compulsory
license in 2007 for HIV/AIDS medicines for export to Rwanda.103
It is important to note that a number of developed countries have
formally notified the WTO that they will not use the system established by
Article 31bis to import pharmaceutical products. This notification is recorded
in the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, and includes: Australia, Canada, the
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 25, at 80-117 (including descriptions of
implementation under domestic law by Canada, China, the European Union, Hong Kong
(China), India, Korea, Switzerland, Croatia, Japan); 2020 Annual Review of the Special
Compulsory Licensing System, supra note 99, app. I, ¶ 8.
101 World Trade Organization, Report to the General Council, Annual Review of the
Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, app. 1, ¶ 4, IP/C/72 (Nov. 9, 2015).
102 World Trade Organization, WTO IP Rules Amended to Ease Poor Countries’ Access to
Affordable Medicines, WTO: 2017 NEWS ITEMS (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news17_e/trip_23jan17_e.htm.
103 See World Trade Organization, Canada is First to Notify Compulsory License to Export
Generic Drug, WTO: 2007 NEWS ITEMS (Oct. 4, 2007), https://www.wto.org/english/
news_e/news07_e/trips_health_notif_oct07_e.htm.
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European Union (including its member States), Iceland, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the United States.104 Other countries have stated
that they would use the system as importers only in cases of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, namely Hong Kong,
China; Israel; Korea; Kuwait; Macao; China; Mexico; Qatar; Singapore; the
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu; Turkey;
and the United Arab Emirates.105
IV. USE OF TRIPS AGREEMENT “FLEXIBILITIES,” AS EXPANDED
PURSUANT TO THE DOHA DECLARATION, TO ISSUE
COMPULSORY LICENSES, AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF
This section examines the recent use of the “flexibility” in the TRIPS
Agreement to issue compulsory licenses on patents covering
biopharmaceutical products—including the expanded flexibility established
in line with Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration—and the implications of
such use. As a preliminary matter, subsection A explains why the Doha
Declaration, followed by the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement,
demonstrates the finite and limited nature of establishing exceptions to WTO
agreements, and the formal process that is required for an amendment.
Subsection B reviews the efforts to compulsory license patents for export
pursuant to the August 2003 Decision and Article 31bis of the TRIPS
Agreement, and the perceptions of these efforts as expressed by WTO
Members. Subsection C then briefly looks at the role and impact of
compulsory licensing, more generally (beyond compulsory licensing under
the Article 31bis system), focusing on the experiences and lessons learned
over the twenty years since adoption of the Doha Declaration.
A. Limited and Finite Nature of Exceptions
As explained above, the TRIPS Agreement reflects a careful balance
that protects both IP rights and other public policy objectives. An integral
component of maintaining this balance is the existence of exceptions and
flexibilities within the TRIPS Agreement. Each of the existing exceptions
was the result of extensive negotiation, and is accommodated in specific
treaty language.
Presently, there is a tendency among certain academics and NGOs to
simply imagine exceptions into existence. Where they would like the balance
in the TRIPS Agreement to be different from the one actually negotiated by
the WTO Members, they simply argue that an exception exists, without
identifying the exception in the treaty text. For example, as noted above, a
South Centre Policy Brief has stated that, in view of the Doha Declaration
(which did not, itself, amend the TRIPS Agreement), “any measure that is
104
105

World Trade Organization, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement, n.3 (2018).
GERVAIS, supra note 80, at 134.
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necessary to protect public health cannot be held to violate the provisions of
TRIPS.”106 In extreme cases, some even argue that exceptions of their choice
exist simply because “the TRIPS Agreement remains silent” on the lack of
such an exception.107
As Solovy and Raju explain:
If silences in the TRIPS Agreement were to be interpreted as
providing for exceptions, one could invent any number of exceptions,
and bring down the entire TRIPS Agreement with those exceptions.
For example, are the general exceptions in Article XX of the General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”) applicable to
the TRIPS Agreement, despite that exception describing its scope as
“this agreement” (i.e., the GATT 1994), and the TRIPS Agreement
not having an analogue? Is there an exception permitting the denial of
patents when applications are filed on a rainy day? Is there an
exception to protection of undisclosed information where the lawful
owner of that information is a person with blond hair? If one fills the
silences with exceptions, one could simply keep going, and rewrite
the entirety of the TRIPS Agreement to ridiculous effect.108

The process followed in the Doha Declaration, and in the subsequent
August 2003 Decision and the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, exposes
the fallacy in imagining exceptions into existence. If the TRIPS Agreement
were full of infinite exceptions which could fill the silences, there would have
been no need for an amendment. However, when the Members saw the need
to alter the existing balance in the TRIPS Agreement to create a new
exception, they found it necessary to do so through a process of negotiation,
and then by the formal process set out in the Marrakesh Agreement for
amendments to the WTO agreements. This underscores that the exceptions
in the TRIPS Agreement (as in all WTO agreements, and indeed, in all
treaties) are limited and finite, and the power to create new exceptions lies
solely with WTO Members, and not in individual academic or NGO
imaginations.
B. Compulsory Licensing Pursuant to TRIPS Article 31bis and the August
2003 Decision
While a number of WTO Members, academics, and NGOs have argued
that the limited use of the system established by Article 31bis and the August
2003 Decision demonstrates the need for additional flexibilities to the TRIPS
Agreement, there is no basis for such an assertion.
106

SOUTH CENTRE POLICY BRIEF NO. 7, supra note 24, at 4.
Olga Gurgula & John Hull, Compulsory Licensing of Trade Secrets: Ensuring Access
to COVID-19 Vaccines Via Involuntary Technology Transfer, 16 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. &
PRAC. 1242, 1251 (2021).
108 Eric M. Solovy & Deepak Raju, Compulsory Licensing of Trade Secrets: Illegality
Under International and Domestic Laws, 55 INT’L LAWYER (forthcoming 2022).
107
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Instead, limited use of the system may constitute evidence that
compulsory licensing of any kind is often a deeply flawed means to the
critically important end of increasing access to medicines, even if such
licenses are issued in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement. As the Swiss
Government correctly pointed out in an annual review of implementation of
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration:
compulsory licences are as such not an easy and quick-fix solution to
address the broader problem of sustainable access to affordable
medicines—whether in developing countries or any other WTO
Member. Implementing a compulsory licence, and again I refer to
normal or special compulsory licences even once granted, pose their
own challenges. A generic manufacturer needs to be found who is
ready, willing and available to produce the medicine needed and the
quantities needed within a short time-period at an affordable and
competitive price and at the required quality and safety standards.
This demonstrates that a compulsory licence is never a quick-fix
solution and this cannot be remedied by the Paragraph 6 System or by
revising it for that matter.109

This section considers the practical experience with the system created
by the August 2003 Decision (and continued with TRIPS Article 31bis)
(subsection 1); the positions expressed by WTO Members about this
experience (subsection 2); and the overall impact of compulsory licensing,
generally (subsection 3).
1. Practical Experience with the System
As noted above, in 2007, Canada was the first country to take advantage
of compulsory licensing for export as inspired by Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration when it issued a compulsory license for HIV/AIDS medicines
for export to Rwanda.110 Canada had also been one of the first countries to
implement into domestic law the type of system set out in the August 2003
Decision, through its Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR) in 2005.111
Pursuant to CAMR, drugs that are produced under compulsory license for
export must appropriately meet the same safety, efficacy and quality
standards as any drug sold in Canada’s domestic market.112
The process that led to the first (and, so far, only) use of the system
began on July 17, 2007, when Rwanda notified the WTO TRIPS Council of
109 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annual Review of
the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, app. 1, ¶ 64, WTO Doc. IP/C/76 (Nov. 23, 2016).
110 See Canada is First to Notify Compulsory License to Export Generic Drug, WTO (Oct.
4, 2007), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/trips_health_notif_oct07_e.htm.
111 Annual Review of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 25,
¶ 7.
112 Id. ¶ 70.
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its intention to import 260,000 packs of HIV/AIDS medicine (TriAvir) made
by Apotex, a Canadian company.113 Two months later, on September 19,
2007, Canada granted an authorization to Apotex to manufacture for and
export that drug to Rwanda under a compulsory license (only 15 days after
receiving the application from Apotex).114 Canada formally notified the
TRIPS Council of this compulsory license on October 4, 2007.115 The
medicines (over 14 million tablets) were ultimately shipped to Rwanda in
September 2008 and 2009.116 Beall et al. found that use of the process set out
in the August 2003 Decision by Canada and Rwanda was ultimately of
“negligible benefit” because Rwanda was able to purchase the same drug
contemporaneously from Indian companies for almost the same price
(US$0.198-US$0.210 per unit compared to US$0.195 per unit from
Apotex).117 In that case, according to Beall et al., “Apotex’s compulsory
licensing pricing struggled to catch up with international procurement
pricing, not the other way around.”118
More recently in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, in February
2021, Bolivia notified the TRIPS Council of its intention to make use of
Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement as an importer.119 Bolivia clarified in
May 2021, that it intends to import an estimated 15 million COVID-19
vaccines pursuant to Article 31bis.120 Antigua and Barbuda followed suit in
May 2021, also notifying the intention to use the system as an importer.121
113 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under
Paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/N/9/RWA/1 (July 19,
2007).
114 Annual Review of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 25,
¶ 11.
115 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under
Paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/N/10/CAN/1 (Oct. 8,
2007).
116 Annual Review of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 25,
¶¶ 7, 12.
117 Reed F. Beall, Randall Kuhn & Amir Attaran, Compulsory Licensing Often Did Not
Produce Lower Prices for Antiretrovirals Compared to International Procurement, 34
HEALTH AFFAIRS 493, 499 (2015).
118 Id.
119 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under
the Amended TRIPS Agreement, Notification of Intention to Use the Special Compulsory
Licensing System as an Importing Member, WTO Doc. IP/N/8/BOL/1 (Feb. 19, 2021).
120 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Bolivia’s
Notification of Need to Import Pharmaceutical Products Under the Special Compulsory
Licensing System, WTO Doc. IP/N/9/BOL/1 (May 11, 2021); Bolivia Outlines Vaccine Import
Needs in Use of WTO Flexibilities to Tackle Pandemic, WTO: 2021 NEWS ITEMS (May 12,
2021), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/dgno_10may21_e.htm.
121 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Antigua and
Barbuda Notification of Intention to Use the Special Compulsory Licensing System as an
Importing Member, WTO Doc. IP/N/8/ATG/1 (May 12, 2021).
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To date, no country has notified an intention to make use of Article 31bis to
export to those Members, although there have been press reports indicating
that Bolivia hopes to import from Canada.122
The WTO Secretariat has pointed out that a notification “does not mean
a commitment to procure medicines under this System” such that a Member
may later opt to procure medicines through other means.123 Indeed, given the
fact that Bolivia and Antigua and Barbuda have ramped up their COVID-19
vaccinations throughout 2021 and 2022, they may ultimately determine that
their needs can be fulfilled through voluntary arrangements. In particular, as
of mid-July 2022, Bolivia has reportedly provided at least first doses to 63
percent of its population, while Antigua and Barbuda has provided at least
first doses to 66 percent of its population.124
2. WTO Members’ Review of the System
Pursuant to the August 2003 Decision (and in line with the general
requirement in Article IX:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement for waivers), the
TRIPS Council has been required to annually review and report on “the
functioning of the System” set out in that decision.125 These reports provide
useful insight into the functioning of the Paragraph 6 System, and the WTO
Members’ views.
During the 2010 review meeting, for example, Canada asserted (as
summarized in the official report) that its use of the system to export HIV
antiretroviral drugs to Rwanda “clearly showed that Canada’s regime and the
System [set out in the August 2003 Decision] were efficient, effective and
timely.”126 In contrast, a number of WTO Members, including India,
Indonesia, Egypt and Venezuela, have criticized the System, pointing to the
fact that it has been used only once, and blaming the limited use on inter alia,
the anti-diversion and notification requirements.127
As stated by Abbott & Reichman, “there remains a widely held belief”
that there has been insufficient use of the System “[d]espite the carefully
122 See Canadian Company Wins COVID-19 Vaccine Deal With Bolivia—and WTO
Support, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (May 11, 2021), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/
article-canadian-company-wins-covid-19-vaccine-deal-with-bolivia-and-wto.
123 2020 Annual Review of the Special Compulsory Licensing System, supra note 99, app.
I, ¶ 11; see also id. at 13.
124 Tracking Coronavirus Vaccinations Around the World, Josh Holder, N.Y. TIMES (July
17, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-vaccinations-tracker.html
(last visited July 17, 2022) (compiling data from Our World in Data project at the University
of Oxford, and reporting Antigua and Barbuda with 66 percent vaccinated (defined to include
at least one dose) and 64 percent fully vaccinated; and Bolivia with 63 percent vaccinated and
52 percent fully vaccinated).
125 August 2003 Decision, supra note 5, ¶ 8.
126 Annual Review of the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6, supra note 25,
Annex ¶ 7.
127 Id. at Annex, ¶¶ 16-17 (India), 27 & 63 (Egypt), 32 (Indonesia), 62 (Venezuela).

281

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

42:253 (2022)

elaborated terms of Article 31bis, or perhaps because of them.”128 In 2012,
Bhattacharya characterized the obstacles to use as the “formalistic nature and
built-in administrative roadblocks” of the August 2003 Decision, as well as
the concern by countries (and companies) about investing “scarce and lumpy
resources under the additional flexibility due to lack of certainty about its
continuation.”129 With the adoption of Article 31bis, however, the latter
concern no longer has any basis.
With respect to the anti-diversion and notification requirements, they
are an integral part of the mechanism created by Article 31bis (and the
August 2003 Decision before it), and indispensable for the achievement of
its objectives.130 When pharmaceutical products are manufactured pursuant
to a compulsory license, with the express purpose that they provide further
access to medicines in one or more particular countries which most need
them, it is imperative to have safeguards to ensure that the products actually
reach their target destinations, and are not diverted to the most profitable
markets. Thus, the anti-diversion safeguards not only protect right holders
that have IP rights in the markets to which the products may be diverted, but
are also essential to furthering the objective of increasing access to
medicines. Moreover, those who argue that the anti-diversion and
notification requirements are burdensome ignore the reality that mechanisms
to track origin and destination of goods, and the requirement that certain trade
actions be notified, are already regular features of international trade,
including various WTO agreements.131 Further, the WTO Secretariat has
128

Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, Facilitating Access to Cross-Border
Supplies of Patented Pharmaceuticals: The Case of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 23 J. OF INT’L
ECON. L., 535, 552 (2020). Abbott and Reichman, themselves, have stated that “this belief in
excessive complexity of the Article 31bis system is not well founded.” Id. (citing Frederick
M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for
the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions,
10 J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 921, 927-29 (2007)).
129 Alexandra Bhattacharya, The Use of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2001): A Review of Implementation Experiences in the
Developing Countries, 13 J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 186, 190 (2012).
130 Trilateral Study, supra note 21, at 304-09 (providing a summary of the anti-diversion
and notification requirements).
131 For example, the Generalized System of Preferences, maintained by Armenia,
Australia, Belarus, Canada, the European Union, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand,
Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United States,
granting LDCs preferential treatment in trade of goods requires that the origin of goods
benefiting from the preference be evidenced through a “GSP Certificate of Origin.” This
requirement, which is necessary to track the origin of goods and the destination in which they
would enjoy the preference, has not prevented LDCs from benefiting from the GSP. See
Generalized System of Preferences, UNCTAD, https://unctad.org/topic/trade-agreements/
generalized-system-of-preferences. Rather than being dissuaded by this origin-tracking
requirement, “[i]n 2019, products valued at about $21.0 billion (imports for consumption)
entered the United States duty-free under the program.” See Vivian C. Johnes & Liana Wong,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33663, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP): OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL33663.pdf (last updated Jan. 7, 2021).
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been available to provide technical assistance relating to the effective use of
the system.132
In light of criticisms largely targeted at the anti-diversion and
notification requirements, a number of WTO Members have strongly
defended the system and provided alternative explanations for the limited use
of the Article 31bis mechanism.
For example, in a 2011 intervention, the European Union expressed its
strong disagreement with Members asserting that the limited use of the
flexibility provided by the August 2003 Decision demonstrated that there
were legal, procedural, commercial and other obstacles that were difficult to
overcome.133 The European Union set out several reasons that it believed
could explain the limited use, namely (1) the vast majority of essential
medicines are already in the public domain (i.e., not patented); (2) LDCs are
still enjoying an extended transition period, such that they are not obligated
to protect patents on pharmaceutical products; and (3) developing countries
can acquire medicines through voluntary licenses or other means consistent
with the TRIPS Agreement that do not require recourse to the system.134
In also defending the system (and its limited use), Canada’s
representative to the TRIPS Council explained that a regime established to
implement the August 2003 Decision:
could only assist in supplying low-cost drugs if a demand was notified
to the WTO by an eligible importing Member for generic drug(s) that
required use of the System. This was a demand-driven process by
countries in need . . . . He noted that, since the adoption of the Decision
in 2003, many options had become available to importing countries.
The international environment for procurement of drugs had changed
significantly with the introduction of a variety of global mechanisms
and alliances which offered greater choice to countries to obtain
medicines. The role and effectiveness as well as the potential for
broader use of the Waiver needed to be understood in this broad global

Similarly, several free trade agreements (“FTAs”) require that the origin of goods be
evidenced to benefit from the terms of the FTA. As for notification requirements, various
WTO agreements require several forms of trade measures to be notified. These include:
subsidies (GATT 1994, Article XVI:1), certain measures on agricultural products (Agreement
on Agriculture, Article 18.2, 18.3), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Article 7), technical regulations (Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade, Articles 2.9.2, 2.10.1, 3.2), trade related investment measures
(Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Article 5), anti-dumping measures (Antidumping Agreement, Article 16.4), and safeguard measures (Agreement on Safeguards,
Article 12).
132 2020 Annual Review of the Special Compulsory Licensing System, supra note 99, ¶ 16.
133 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annual Review of
the Decision on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 64, WTO Doc. IP/C/61 (Nov. 18, 2011).
134 Id. ¶ 65.
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context.
. . . [T]he System had never been intended to solve the issue of access
to medicines on its own, but was seen as part of a broader international
strategy to combat diseases impacting the developing world. The
System and CAMR functioned well. They played a supporting role
and were not a panacea to the challenges faced on global access to
medicines and were not designed to generate global supply.135

The Swiss representative added that the countries criticizing the
effectiveness of the August 2003 Decision may be misconstruing
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, pointing out that the mandate “had not,
and could not possibly have been, to solve the problem of affordable access
to medicines for the poor in developing countries through such a solution,
although some Members seemed to expect the System to achieve exactly that
goal and measured its success by this standard.”136 Switzerland has, in recent
communications, emphasized that Article 31bis “has not been conceived for
frequent use” but rather “applies to eligible beneficiary countries, in a
specific case scenario and under particular circumstances.”137 Switzerland
has criticized as “misleading” any implication that “many casualties that
today still—and tragically enough—result from insufficient and untimely
access to medicines would be the result of IP or perceived deficiencies in the
system provided by Art. 31bis.”138
The United States has likewise emphasized that the Paragraph 6 system
was “only one tool for addressing the larger issue of access to medicines,”
and that this issue must also be addressed by a variety of other means; in that
context, the United States emphasized that it had “been supporting the
innovation and intellectual property protection that was vital to developing
new medicines and achieving other medical breakthroughs.”139
C. Impact of Compulsory Licensing
Despite studies finding that, in recent years, approximately 95 percent
(or greater) of essential medicines were not protected by patents,140 those that
135

Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
Id. ¶ 59.
137 2020 Annual Review of the Special Compulsory Licensing System, supra note 99, at
app. I, ¶ 73.
138 Id.
139 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 133, ¶
65.
140 See, e.g., Reed F. Beall, Patents and the WHO Model List of Essential Medicines (18th
ed.): Clarifying the Debate on IP and Access, WIPO GLOBAL CHALLENGES BRIEF 2 (“Of the
375 items on the 2013 WHO MLEM, 95% are off-patent, meaning that these medicines
patents’ have expired and that generic equivalents are likely available. This result is consistent
with previous studies, as the percentage of off-patent MLEM products has regularly been
above 90%. Attaran found that 94% (300 of 319) of the 2003 MLEM items were likely to be
136
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contend that IP rights are the greatest global barrier to access to medicines
continue to place blame on the existence of patents and call for, inter alia,
increased compulsory licensing.
Specifically, a WIPO-sponsored report authored by Beall and Attaran
concluded in 2016 that, of the 375 medicines on the World Health
Organization’s Model List of Essential Medicines (MLEM), as of 2013, only
seven were covered by patents on active compounds.141 This amounted to
patents on just two percent of the MLEM medicines, which represented a
decline since similar analyses were performed in 2004 and 2009.142
With the MLEM expanding to include more treatments for noncommunicable diseases, such as cancer, the number of patented
medicines included on that list may ultimately increase. That said,
according to Beall and Attaran, this will provide: “more opportunities
to choose new collaborations over conflict (whether in the form of
licensing agreements or more creative solutions not yet envisaged)
and to avoid repeating past friction between advocates for essential
medicines access and advocates for patent protection during the
HIV/AIDS crisis.”143

Because there are so many barriers to access to pharmaceutical products
that have nothing to do with IP rights, as discussed in Section V.B, below, it
is not surprising that those countries that have issued compulsory licenses in
line with their understanding of the metes and bounds of the TRIPS
Agreement (whether or not that understanding was correct) have not found
compulsory licensing to be the silver bullet for their problems. Further,
empirical data collected on the impact of compulsory licensing demonstrate
that compulsory licensing may, in fact, have the opposite of the intended
effect on prices of medicines, relative to other possible options.
To wit, a 2015 study by Beall, Kuhn, and Attaran reported as follows:
Thirty compulsory license cases were analyzed with 673 comparable
procurements from WHO and Global Fund data. Compulsory license
prices exceeded the median international procurement prices in
nineteen of the thirty case studies, often with a price gap of more than
25 percent. Compulsory licensing often delivered suboptimal value
when compared to the alternative of international procurement,
off-patent, and Kowalski and Cavicchi found that 95% (333 of 350) were when using the 2009
MLEM. Our preliminary assessment of the recently published 2015 MLEM has this number
at 92% (375 of 409).”) (footnotes omitted); D. Wayne Taylor, Pharmaceutical Access in Least
Developed Countries: On-the-Ground Barriers and Industry Successes, CAMERON INSTITUTE
5 (2010) (“WHO’s list of essential medicines is comprised of over 95% off-patent products—
the remainder being primarily second-line anti-AIDS medicines.”).
141 Reed Beall & Amir Attaran, Global Challenges Report: Patent-based Analysis of the
World Health Organization’s 2013 Model List of Essential Medicines 25, WIPO (2016).
142 Id.
143 Id. at 26.
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especially when used by low-income countries to manufacture
medicines locally. There is an ongoing need for multilateral and
charitable actors to work collectively with governments and medicine
suppliers on policy options.144

Further, Beall, Kuhn, and Attaran explain that voluntary licenses
provide a more successful route to increasing access to drugs at reasonable
prices in developing countries; they point, by way of example, to Gilead’s
decision to grant Indian generic firms the right to manufacture and export
generic versions of sofosbuvir and ledipasvir for hepatitis C to 91 countries,
in exchange for a modest royalty.145
Nevertheless, those who generally disfavor patents on pharmaceutical
products persist in touting the benefits of compulsory licensing, and in
advocating for other ways to limit IP protection on pharmaceutical products.
In a recent South Centre policy brief, Gurgula asserts that “[t]here is no doubt
that compulsory licensing can be an effective tool in facilitating access to
affordable medicines, as can be evidenced by its use in relation to life-saving
drugs by several countries in the past.”146 In support, Gurgula refers only to
a “TRIPS Flexibilities Database” published by the “Medicines Law &
Policy” NGO (which, itself, advocates for expanded use of the flexibilities in
the TRIPS Agreement).147 While this database claims to list instances where
countries have granted compulsory licenses, there is nothing in this database
that “evidence[s]” (to use Gurgula’s term) that they were an “effective tool
in facilitating access to affordable medicines” beyond what could have been
accomplished through voluntary arrangements. Nor does Gurgula consider
whether, in the long term, those compulsory licenses may have negatively
impacted the pace of innovation or the willingness of companies to invest in,
or share technology with, the countries that issued these licenses. Such
factors must be part of any analysis of whether, particularly in the long term,
compulsory licensing is an “effective tool in facilitating access to affordable
medicines.”
Fundamentally, when a WTO Member abuses its power to compulsory
license, or to threaten to issue compulsory licenses, such abuse serves to
lower the overall credibility of that country’s patent system, and the
incentives to develop new technologies that its system may create. This has
long-term implications for access to medicines, and goes against the balance
that the TRIPS Agreement intends to achieve, in line with the object and
144

Reed F. Beall, Randall Kuhn & Amir Attaran, supra note 117, at 493 (Abstract)
(emphasis added).
145 Id. at 499.
146 OLGA GURGULA, SOUTH CENTRE POLICY BRIEF NO. 104, COMPULSORY LICENSING VS.
THE IP WAIVER: WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO END THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC? 2 (2021),
https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/PB104_Compulsory-licensing-vs.the-IP-waiver_EN-2.pdf.
147 Medicines Law & Policy, TRIPS Flexibilities Database, http://tripsflexibilities.
medicineslawandpolicy.org/.
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purpose set out in Articles 7 and 8 thereof. Indeed, several studies have found
that patent protection in developing countries—rather than robust use of
“flexibilities” that reduce or eliminate such protection—improves the
availability of medicines in the long term.148
Thus, compulsory licensing does not appear to be either an effective or
sustainable manner to improve access to medicines, and in the long term
would be expected to backfire by reducing incentives for innovation for new
technologies that could improve public health. While the TRIPS Agreement
makes them a viable option, WTO Members must carefully weigh the costs
and benefits (both short-term and long-term) before deciding whether to
exercise that option.
V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DOHA DECLARATION, AND
RELEVANCE TO THE DEBATE OVER PROTECTION OF IP RIGHTS
COVERING COVID-19 VACCINES AND THERAPEUTICS
In the 2021 version of the Trilateral Study (as updated to cover issues
related to the COVID-19 pandemic), the WTO, WIPO and WHO begin their
joint report’s discussion of IP rights as they should—by focusing on the
critical role of IP in innovation: “The global IP system provides an incentive
framework in which urgently needed innovation in relation to COVID‑19 can
148

Cockburn, Lanjouw, and Schankerman conducted a study that found as follows:
Using new data on launches of 642 new molecules in 76 countries during 19832002, we show that, all else equal, longer and more extensive patent protection
accelerated diffusion, while price regulation strongly delayed it. Health policy
institutions, and economic factors that make markets more profitable, also sped up
diffusion. These results hold both for developing countries and high income
countries, and the results are robust to using instrumental variables to address the
endogeneity of policy regimes.
Iain M. Cockburn, Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patents and the Global Diffusion
of New Drugs 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 20492, 2014) (emphasis
added). In considering whether a given country had strong patent protection, the study took
into account, among other factors, the use of compulsory licenses. See id. at 33-34. See also
Joan-Ramon Borrell, Patents and the Faster Introduction of New Drugs in Developing
Countries, 12 Applied Econ. Letters 379, 379 (2005) (“This paper uses sales data on
HIV/AIDS drugs in a sample of 34 low and middle-income countries between 1995 and 1999.
It estimates a reduced-form probit model to assess empirically the impact of market exclusivity
on introduction of new drug therapy. The main finding is that the patent regime had a positive
effect on the introduction of new HIV/AIDS drugs in the subset of countries of the sample used
with relatively equally distributed incomes.” (emphasis added)); Ernst R. Berndt & Iain M.
Cockburn, The Hidden Cost of Low Prices: Limited Access to New Drugs in India, 33 HEALTH
AFF. 1567 (2014) (“Launch lags could be reduced by implementing policies that encourage
innovator companies to bring new products to the Indian market. These policies include
bringing India’s patent law into closer conformity with laws in the United States and the
European Union and delaying the onset of generic competition through regulatory means.
Such changes would promote faster access to a wider range of new drugs for residents of India
without affecting the pricing of currently available drugs, and there is little evidence that they
would result in substantially higher prices for new drugs than can be expected under the
current regime.”).
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be encouraged. It covers the stages from invention to supply of a product or
service.”149 The Trilateral Study then turns its attention to the “flexibilities”
that are “built into the international IP regime,” and how they can be used to
promote access to those COVID-19-related innovations.150 Among the
flexibilities covered in the report is compulsory licensing (both pursuant to
Article 31 as well as the Article 31bis system).151 As a matter of public policy,
the 2021 Trilateral Study notes that several countries (i.e., Israel, Hungary,
and Russia) have already issued compulsory licenses on COVID-19
treatments (without adjudging the TRIPS consistency of such actions).152 The
study further recalls the notifications made by Bolivia in early 2021, as well
as by Antigua and Bermuda, of an intent to import vaccines pursuant to
Article 31bis.153
The Trilateral Study also describes the use of “voluntary actions and
initiatives” to further promote access to innovations needed to slow or end
the COVID-19 pandemic, including voluntary actions to license vaccine
technology globally, such as licenses from developed-country innovators to
developing-country manufacturers.154 The Study references, among other
organizations and collaborations, the Coalition of Epidemic Preparedness
Innovations (CEPI), which provides funding for the development of new
vaccines in return for a commitment by innovators to provide “equitable
access to any vaccine developed through its funding,” and to transfer
technology to enable production by a global network of manufacturers.155
With these COVID-19-related observations from the 2021 Trilateral
Study in mind, the subsections that follow consider how the lessons learned
since adoption of the Doha Declaration are relevant for understanding the
market developments and policy debates related to the creation of, and access
to, COVID-19 vaccines and treatments. In particular, Section A considers the
benefits enjoyed as a result of the innovation supported, incentivized and
licensed as a consequence of strong global IP protection, as reaffirmed by the
Doha Declaration. Indeed, hundreds of partnerships and collaborations
among manufacturers around the world have resulted in the provision of
more than 12 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines around the globe by midJuly 2022.156 Section B highlights the barriers to access to COVID-19
149

Trilateral Study, supra note 21, at 9.
Id. at 21.
151 WTO, WIPO & WHO, PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES AND
INNOVATION UPDATED EXTRACT: INTEGRATED HEALTH, TRADE AND IP APPROACH TO RESPOND
TO THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, 30 AUGUST 2021 8-9 (2d ed., 2021), https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/booksp_e/who-wipo-wto_2021_e.pdf [hereinafter 2021 Updated Trilateral
Study].
152 Id. at 8.
153 Id. at 9.
154 Id. at 10.
155 Id. at 12.
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therapeutics and vaccines that are not related to IP rights, but which were
already recognized at the time of adoption of the Doha Declaration. Such
barriers are often obscured during policy debates over IP rights. Section C
then considers a misguided proposal by several academics to establish a
global mass compulsory licensing mechanism covering all COVID-19related technologies and related clinical test data.
A. Benefits During a Global Pandemic of Innovation and Collaboration
Incentivized and Protected by IP Rights
Despite exhibiting numerous flaws in its discussion of the TRIPS
Agreement and its “flexibilities,”157 the Report of the United Nations
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines
acknowledged in 2016 how far the world has come in terms of the availability
of new medicines and vaccines, stating as follows:
Never in the past has our knowledge of science been so profound and
the possibilities to treat all manner of diseases so great. Many sources
of transmissible and non-transmissible diseases have been identified,
and therefore prevention, including the fight against bacteria, viruses
and parasites, has improved dramatically. New generations of
medicines and their combinations are treating patients whose
prognosis some years ago would have been fatal. . . . Progress in
fundamental research is nourishing an exceptional phase of
development of medicines, vaccines, diagnostics and medical
devices.158

The successful development of the COVID-19 vaccines (with more still
being developed) is indeed a tribute to strong IP protection and the incentives
that it creates in the WTO Members where those vaccines—which have
saved millions of lives around the world—are being developed and
manufactured.
After having first been discovered by French scientists in 1961, many
years of research led to a realization that therapeutic use of mRNA
technology would require overcoming difficult obstacles.159 Researchers
around the world worked to further understand and develop the mRNA
technology, and protected their innovations with patents and trade secrets,
bloomberg.com/graphics/covid-vaccine-tracker-global-distribution/ (last visited July 17,
2022)
157 See generally Solovy & Krishnamurthy, supra note 19.
158 UN SECRETARY-GENERAL & CO-CHAIRS OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL, REPORT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO MEDICINE:
PROMOTING INNOVATION AND ACCESS TO HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2016), https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00c1a3ef761/t/57d9c6ebf5e231b2f02cd3d4/
1473890031320/UNSG+HLP+Report+FINAL+12+Sept+2016.pdf.
159 See JENNIFER BRANT & MARK F. SCHULTZ, UNPRECEDENTED: THE RAPID INNOVATION
RESPONSE TO COVID-19 AND THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 20 (2021).
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including patents that have now been licensed to the companies that are
producing and distributing billions of doses of their COVID-19 vaccines.160
According to the Head of Patents at Merck KGaA, “IP enabled the early
discussions for COVID-19 collaborations and exchanges.”161 The
availability of IP protection also provided the incentives necessary to raise
the private funds that moved the mRNA research from the laboratory to
clinical application, even though such technology had never before led to a
commercially successful product of any kind.
While the U.S. Government, through Operation Warp Speed, provided
additional funding for design, testing and ultimately delivery of Moderna’s
COVID-19 vaccine, such support came only after Moderna had been able to
convince private funders that it could take an untested technology and bring
it to market.162 Indeed, before going public in 2018, Moderna had raised over
$2 billion in investments and partnership funding, along with $600 million
for an IPO.163 At the time of its IPO, Moderna was spending hundreds of
millions of dollars a year, reporting in September 2018 that it “had an
accumulated deficit of $865.2 million.”164 At that time, financial reporters
noted that “[l]osses may never be recouped, as the company is years away
from actual product sales.”165 While the investment in Moderna turned out to
be a great success, both for investors and for the world, other investments in
related technology were not so successful. For example, Merck & Co. and
CureVac each failed in their robust and costly attempts to create a COVID19 vaccine.166 This provides a helpful reminder that the incentives for
innovation and investment fueled by IP protection must be sufficient to
overcome the disincentives that arise from the very real possibility of failure,
which can occur at any stage of development, testing, or commercialization.
As reported by the New York Times, in 2018, Dr. Ugur Sahin, the cofounder of BioNTech, predicted that his company might be able to use
mRNA technology to quickly develop a vaccine in the event of a global
pandemic.167 Dr. Sahin and his wife, Dr. Tureci, had been working on mRNA
technology for more than 25 years, without any successful commercial
applications.168 As of 2018, BioNTech had been investing time and money
160

Id. at 20-21.
See id. at 26.
162 See id. at 28.
163 Id. at 21; Sarah Toy, Moderna: 5 Things to Know About the Largest Biotech to IPO,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/moderna-ipo-5-thingsto-know-about-what-could-be-the-largest-biotech-ipo-in-history-2018-12-05.
164 Toy, supra note 163.
165 Id.
166 BRANT & SCHULTZ, supra note 159, at 32-33.
167 David Gelles, The Husband-and-Wife Team Behind the Leading Vaccine to Solve
Covid-19, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/business/
biontech-covid-vaccine.html.
168 Bojan Pancevski & Jared S. Hopkins, How Pfizer Partner BioNTech Became a Leader
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290

The Doha Declaration at Twenty
42:253 (2022)

into using mRNA technology for cancer treatment, but without having yet
brought any such treatment to market.169
The Wall Street Journal reported that, when BioNTech and Pfizer
scientists met in 2017 to discuss possible collaborations on treating infectious
diseases with mRNA technology, Pfizer’s head of vaccine R&D was initially
skeptical about BioNTech’s platform.170 It was the prospect of strong
protection for patentable inventions, valuable trade secrets and, eventually,
costly test data required for regulatory approval, that enabled inventors (and
investors) like Dr. Sahin and Dr. Tureci to take the huge risks necessary to
invent these new technologies and bring them to market.171 While Pfizer’s
CEO has noted that Dr. Sahin “cares only about science” and that
“[d]iscussing business is not his cup of tea,” it must also be the case that
without the prospect of receiving a return on a risky investment like that
which Drs. Tureci and Sahin were making, BioNTech may very well not have
been in a position to have the technology ready to begin working towards a
vaccine so early in the pandemic.172 Dr. Sahin and his team reportedly got to
work on using BioNTech’s technology to create a COVID-19 vaccine in
January 2020, after reading an article in the Lancet about the initial
emergence of the virus in China.173 Their staff cancelled their vacations and
worked seven days a week, beginning with twenty vaccine candidates in late
February, of which four were selected for a trial in Germany.174
BioNTech’s leaders knew early on that they were not in a position to
produce the massive quantities of vaccine that would be necessary to
vaccinate the world.175 Thus, they entered into an agreement to license their
IP rights to Pfizer, which had the capability and experience to enable mass
production of a vaccine, and to receive regulatory approval around the world
as quickly as possible.176 As Pfizer explained in its press release announcing
their co-development agreement, “by pairing Pfizer’s development,
regulatory and commercial capabilities with BioNTech’s mRNA vaccine
technology and expertise as one of the industry leaders, we are reinforcing
our commitment to do everything we can to combat this escalating pandemic,
as quicky as possible.”177
in Coronavirus Vaccine Race, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
how-pfizer-partner-biontech-became-a-leader-in-coronavirus-vaccine-race-11603359015.
169 Gelles, supra note 167.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.; Pancevski & Hopkins, supra note 168.
175 Pancevski & Hopkins, supra note 168.
176 Id.
177 Press Release, Pfizer, Pfizer and BioNTech to Co-Develop Potential COVID-19
Vaccine (Mar. 17, 2020), https://investors.pfizer.com/investor-news/press-release-details/
2020/Pfizer-and-BioNTech-to-Co-Develop-Potential-COVID-19-Vaccine/default.aspx.
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In addition to the formal agreements, the scientists and executives at
BioNTech and Pfizer worked very closely together, as a team. Indeed, in
explaining how the two companies moved forward even before they had
finalized the financial terms of the partnership agreement, Dr. Sahin pointed
out that “[t]rust and personal relationship is so important in such business,
because everything is going so fast,”178 emphasizing that “[it] was all about
trust.”179 Pfizer emphasized that it:
would add their considerable development expertise and
infrastructure to help BioNTech realize the potential of their
technology. It took some time to work through all the details, but we
reached an agreement that leveraged both of our strengths in pursuit
of doing something that many thought was impossible.180

The Wall Street Journal reports that, at the outset of the collaboration, Dr.
Sahin and Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla were speaking “several times a day,” as
well as on the weekends.181
It is this type of voluntary collaboration, and the development of trust
among the collaborators, that generated the rapid development and approval
of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine. The same was true for other COVID-19
vaccine developers, including Johnson & Johnson, which collaborated with
an immunologist and virologist at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center to
develop its one-dose vaccine182 Government intervention in the form of
compulsory licensing of patents, and threatened compulsory licensing of
trade secrets, does nothing to create this essential ingredient of trust and
collaboration between innovator and licensee. Rather than leveraging
strengths of two partners, a compulsory license can create, from the outset, a
difficult and unwelcome relationship, to the extent the innovator and licensee
develop any relationship at all.
The ability to ramp-up production through partnership between
innovators and other companies is likewise made possible due to the
confidence that companies around the globe can share information (including
trade secrets) across borders, and license patent rights, in the expectation that
those IP rights will be protected. In the case of the BioNTech-Pfizer
relationship, it was BioNTech that owned the IP predominantly directed
toward the vaccine.183 According to a Pfizer executive, “IP protection was
critical . . . I can’t speak for BioNTech, but I cannot imagine they would be
178
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comfortable sharing their proprietary MRNA technology with a company
like Pfizer without having IP protection.”184
To take another example, UK-based AstraZeneca entered into voluntary
license agreements with the Serum Institute of India pursuant to which they
are working together to supply one billion doses, for low-and-middle-income
countries, of the COVID-19 vaccine first developed by Oxford University,
with support from CEPI and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.185 As AstraZeneca
announced: “The Company is building a number of supply chains in parallel
across the world to support global access at no profit during the pandemic
and has so far secured manufacturing capacity for two billion doses of the
potential vaccine.”186 Also with respect to AstraZeneca’s COVID-19
vaccine, CSL Behring has agreed to transition elements of its Australian
manufacturing capacity to manufacture fifty million doses of that vaccine for
local use in Australia and neighboring islands.187
With respect to Johnson & Johnson’s COVID-19 vaccine, it has
partnered with Merck & Co. to expand manufacturing capacity.188 Similarly,
Pfizer and BioNTech have entered into a license agreement with Novartis
(which used to have its own vaccine business) that allows Novartis to use its
facilities to help contribute to production of additional Pfizer-BioNTech
COVID-19 vaccines in Switzerland.189 Similarly, Sanofi has been supporting
manufacture of three different vaccines (i.e., Pfizer-BioNTech, Johnson &
Johnson, and Moderna), with the aim of providing half a billion doses of
those vaccines throughout the world.190 As explained by Pfizer, “IP
facilitated these relationships” in the same way that it facilitated the
relationship between Pfizer and BioNTech, pointing to patents and trade
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Patients Around the World (June 2, 2021), https://www.cslbehring.com/newsroom/2020/
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secrets.191
With a particular focus on developing countries, Pfizer and BioNTech
have entered into an agreement with South Africa-based Biovac to
manufacture the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine for distribution
exclusively within the African Union.192 Beginning in 2022, they anticipate
that this collaboration will result in production and distribution of over 100
million finished doses in Africa.193
Beyond vaccines, innovators have likewise agreed to robust voluntary
licensing arrangements for COVID-19 therapeutics. In October 2021, for
example, the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) and Merck & Co. announced that
they entered into “a voluntary licensing agreement to facilitate affordable
global access for molnupiravir, an investigational oral COVID-19 antiviral
medicine for the treatment of mild-to-moderate COVID-19 in adults who are
at risk for progressing to severe COVID-19 and/or hospitalization.”194
According to Merck, this will help create access in 105 low- and middleincome countries.195 The agreement allows the MPP, in turn, to further
license to manufacturers so as to “diversify the manufacturing base for the
supply” of the COVID-19 antiviral medicine.196 Because molnupiravir is a
small molecule drug (which would be easier to manufacture than a biologic,
as a technical matter), it would appear to be particularly amenable to such a
robust global voluntary licensing scheme.
A recent study published by The Lancet Public Health concluded that
voluntary licenses through the MPP mechanisms, which allow for “broad
access to quality-assured, affordable versions of high-volume, low cost, oral
tablet drug formulations,” have led to “both economic and health benefits for
people in [low and middle-income countries], saving money and lives.”197
Such licenses constitute another voluntary tool in the toolkit for companies,
governments, universities, non-profits, and international organizations
191
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looking for ways to expand access to medicines, particularly for developing
countries, without recourse to compulsory licensing.
Another option for increasing access to patented medicines in
developing countries is for patent owners to issue “non-assert declarations”
or “non-assertion covenants,” pursuant to which they commit not to enforce
certain patents in a defined group of countries.198 Even before the
authorization or launch of its revolutionary COVID-19 vaccine, Moderna
declared that “while the pandemic continues, Moderna will not enforce our
COVID-19 related patents against those making vaccines intended to combat
the pandemic.”199
With respect to trade secrets, as the United States emphasized in
advocating for the inclusion of Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement back in
1989, protection of trade secrets is “important for developing countries since
there was no better way of encouraging the transfer of technology to
developing countries than to provide protection to trade secrets and
proprietary information which constituted the very essence of the transfer of
technology.”200 In June 2021, the WHO announced the establishment of
mRNA technology transfer hubs in Africa, beginning with the first one in
South Africa led by a consortium comprising Biovac, Afrigen Biologics and
Vaccines, a network of universities, and the Africa Centres for Disease
Control and Prevention, and with the support of France.201 The aim of these
hubs is to allow mRNA technology to be established at industrial scale, and
to provide training, necessary licenses, and share “the production know-how”
(including trade secrets) with local manufacturers.202 Here, again, IP
protection is important to enable this type of voluntary collaboration that will
make a big difference in improving access to COVID-19 vaccines.
Brant and Schultz have found that, as of August 1, 2020, there were over
40 different manufacturing partnerships to produce the main components of
COVID-19 vaccines; 27 partnerships to place vaccines in vials, label and
prepare them for distribution; and 6 distribution partnerships to provide

198 See Voluntary Licenses and Non-Assert Declarations: Actions by R&D Pharmaceutical
Companies that Facilitate Access to Medicines, IFPMA (July 28, 2010),
https://www.ifpma.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2010_07_28_IFPMA_Statement_
VoluntaryLicensing_NonAssert_28Ju.pdf.
199 See Press Release, Moderna, Statement by Moderna on Intellectual Property Matters
During the COVID-19 Pandemic (Oct. 8, 2020), https://investors.modernatx.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/statement-moderna-intellectual-property-matters-during-covid19.
200 Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, supra note 59, ¶ 61.
201 WHO Supporting South African Consortium to Establish First COVID mRNA Vaccine
Technology Transfer Hub, WHO (June 21, 2021), https://www.who.int/news/item/21-062021-who-supporting-south-african-consortium-to-establish-first-covid-mrna-vaccinetechnology-transfer-hub.
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regional capabilities in over 25 countries.203
B. Recognition of Multiple Non-IP-related Measures that Act as Barriers
to Access to Vaccines and Medicines
While the debate over the relationship between IP and access to
medicines often dominates the headlines, it is well accepted that numerous
trade barriers exist that, if removed, would facilitate trade in products
necessary to improve global health without impacting the IP rights that are
essential to incentivizing development and availability of the products and
technologies in the first place. Moreover, developed countries can take
affirmative steps to improve access for the developing world, including
through financial assistance, technical assistance, and donations of vaccines
and therapeutics. For a global pandemic like COVID-19, where new variants
evolve and spread back-and-forth across borders, it is indeed in the long-term
self-interests of developed countries to take such actions.
As the United States, itself, explained just a few days before signing
onto the Doha Declaration: “TRIPS is just one element of the needed
global response to a pandemic such as HIV/AIDS. The United States
is pursuing a comprehensive, integrated approach, stressing
education, prevention, care, training and treatment.” 204

As part of this comprehensive approach, the United States highlighted
that, at the time of the Doha Declaration’s adoption, it was “the largest
bilateral donor of funds for HIV/AIDS assistance, providing over $2 billion
per year on related research, much of which helps to address developing
country problems.”205
In the course of the annual review meetings of the 2003 Decision, the
European Union similarly explained that:
Other aspects had to be taken into account with regard to access to
medicines, such as financing of medicine purchases, the setting-up
and financing of health-care systems, the financing of research
targeting neglected diseases and the development of appropriate
pricing and reimbursement policies. These issues went well beyond
intellectual property and patent protection.206

During those same regular annual review meetings, the United States
emphasized other “tools” that can be used to improve access to medicines,
including:
203
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(i) enhancing legal certainty for manufacturers of generic medicines;
(ii) eliminating tariffs on medicines and medical devices, thereby
decreasing costs for hospitals, clinics, aid organizations and
consumers, among others; (iii) reducing customs obstacles to
medicines by minimizing import barriers, such as discriminatory,
burdensome, and unpredictable customs procedures, that impeded
access to innovative and generic medicines; (iv) curbing trade in
counterfeit medicines by making customs and criminal enforcement
measures available to prevent medicines bearing counterfeit
trademarks from entering national markets, and thus supporting
efforts of countries to address the serious risks to patients posed by
such counterfeits; (v) reducing internal barriers to distribution of
medicines by guaranteeing importing, exporting, and distribution
rights with respect to medicines and minimizing internal barriers that
could stand in the way of efficiently distributing medicines to those in
need; and (vi) minimizing unnecessary regulatory barriers by
promoting transparent and nondiscriminatory regulatory structures to
facilitate the availability of safe and efficacious medicines to the
public.207

On the topic of tariffs and its impact on access to medicine, the United
States elaborated in subsequent TRIPS Council meetings that such tariffs are
“borne by consumers, and more specifically by patients.”208 While some
countries have agreed to eliminate tariffs on medicines and active ingredients
(the so-called “zero-for-zero” agreement), other countries continue to require
high tariffs on those products. The European Union supported the United
States on this point, stating as follows:
It is very difficult to understand how countries who have problems of
access to medicines and who clearly point to intellectual property as
the main culprit for this, can keep very high import tariffs on
pharmaceuticals. I assume tha[sic] this can only be explained for
reasons of protection of a domestic industry, but the fact is that this is
an obstacle to access to medicines by the poorest layers of society.209

In July 2021, the WTO Secretariat prepared an “Information Note” that
provides a long list of such trade barriers (as identified by speakers at a WTO
webinar and symposium) in the context of providing access to “products to
combat COVID-19.”210 The Information Note highlighted one “common
207
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theme,” i.e., “essential goods and inputs need to flow efficiently and
expeditiously to support the rapid scaling up of COVID-19 production
capacity worldwide,” such that a delay of even a single component may slow
everything down given the globally integrated supply chains.211
According to the Information Note, some of the “trade-related
bottlenecks” in this context include: (i) absence of expedited procedures for
import and export of vaccine inputs; (ii) difficulty in sending noncommercial samples for testing and quality control purposes to laboratories
located across borders due to import/export procedures and restrictions; (iii)
taxes and tariffs, or long exemption processes, imposed on products
(including vaccines) intended for combatting COVID-19 (including even on
donations); (iv) administrative difficulties of conducting cross-border
business due to limited services in embassies and consulates; (v) difficult and
time-consuming regulatory frameworks, procedures and timelines for
acquiring regulatory approval in many countries; (vi) lengthy border
clearance conditions for products ancillary to vaccines (e.g., syringes and
refrigerators); and (vii) technical barriers to trade that differ across
countries.212
C. Evaluation of a Misguided Proposal to Expand the Permissible Scope
of Compulsory Licensing During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Abbott and Reichman recently published an article proposing a type of
mass compulsory licensing mechanism for all patents covering the treatment
and prevention of COVID-19.213 They do so after first setting the scene on
their general views on IP rights, stating that it is an “open question” whether
IP rights are “necessary or useful in the context of addressing the COVID-19
pandemic.”214
Specifically, they propose that governments require that “owners of
patents must place their patents into a ‘pool’ from which licenses must be
freely taken and used by manufacturing companies in return for specified
compensation.”215 They indicate that such a pool of compulsory licensed
patents should be managed by a global licensing facility established by
“countries party to existing regional agreements, or simply by groups of likeminded countries.”216 Further, Abbott and Reichman propose that there
should be no marketing exclusivity linked to the data submitted for regulatory
approval, based on, inter alia, the clinical testing that comes at great expense
to the innovators.217
211
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214
215
216
217
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While the first part of their proposal would appear to potentially run
afoul of multiple aspects of Articles 31 and 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement
for failure to satisfy the requisite conditions for compulsory licensing (e.g.,
requirements to consider requests on their individual merits, limitations on
scope and duration of individual compulsory licenses, and limitations on
exports subject to meeting the conditions in Article 31bis), the second part
would violate the obligations of WTO Members to protect test data pursuant
to Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement.218
The fact that a subset of WTO Members might agree to work together
to establish a compulsory licensing scheme that violates the TRIPS
Agreement would not somehow render that scheme consistent with the
WTO. Curiously, Abbott and Reichman made this proposal at a time before
any vaccines or therapeutics for COVID-19 had been developed and/or
authorized in any country219—which was precisely the time when the
incentives for innovation, and investment in testing the efficacy and safety of
new products, were most needed. Had such a proposal been implemented, it
may very well have diminished the resources and time invested when, as
Abbott and Reichman admitted, the “ultimate degree of effectiveness [of any
future vaccine or therapeutic] remain[ed] uncertain.”220 While Abbott and
Reichman agree that “[c]learly, innovators should be paid well for their
efforts,”221 and also assert that “diverse contribution and royalty payment
options are available,” they recognize that “a specific formula is not
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prescribed in [their] article.”222 Yet, the incentives for innovation and
investment created by IP protection derive from market expectations, and not
from the untested possibility that governments may someday agree to band
together to devise some functional and reasonable compensation scheme for
all vaccines and therapeutics directed at ending the global pandemic.
This proposal would also result in practical obstacles given the
difficulties that manufacturers would face in producing any vaccine or
therapeutic based only on information found in patents and test data, without
the guidance, direction, and cooperation from those who were first able to
successfully develop the technology and produce those products. As
explained above in Section V.A, beyond the technology and raw data, a key
element to the successful launch and production of the COVID-19 vaccines,
for example, has been the spirit of cooperation and collaboration between
those who invented the underlying technology and those who attempted to
build upon that technology and rapidly scale up mass production. To recall,
in discussing the relationship between BioNTech and Pfizer, the co-founder
of BioNTech pointed out that “[it] was all about trust.”223 This would not take
place in the type of compulsory patent pool scenario proposed by Abbott and
Reichman.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the twenty years since adoption of the Doha Declaration, it has
become clear that WTO Members anticipated quite well the importance of
continuing to provide incentives for innovation and ensuring access to the
fruits of such innovation. When Members gathered together in Doha, Qatar
in 2001 to consider the relationship between IP rights and the public health
crises facing the world at that time, they reaffirmed the principles already set
out in the TRIPS Agreement, and highlighted the permissible flexibilities.
While the Doha Declaration included a call for action to modify the TRIPS
Agreement in order to enable compulsory licensing for export and to extend
some of the transition periods for LDCs, it did not itself result in any changes
to the TRIPS Agreement.
Given that many WTO Members have opted to provide strong IP
protection in line with their TRIPS Agreement obligations, innovators from
around the world had already been developing new technologies, including
mRNA technologies, that required many years and billions of dollars in
investments before they could potentially bear fruit (in terms of benefits to
patients, and revenue). They could do so with faith that the fruits of their
labor, creativity and teamwork—in this case, IP rights—would be protected,
and that they could license those rights to partners that would be obligated
by law to protect them. The result was the remarkable ability to develop, and
receive emergency approval for, COVID-19 vaccines in less than one year,
222
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when the fastest that a vaccine had previously been developed (from viral
sampling to approval) was four years (for mumps).224 Innovators and their
partners were then able to create several vaccines, as a result of which over
12.2 billion shots were administered (as of mid-July 2022)—enough to fully
vaccinate almost 75% of the global population—only 19 months after the
first vaccine was authorized for emergency use.225
While there is still much to do in terms of improving distribution of
COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics in developing countries, and while
more of such vaccines and therapeutics are in development, it is important to
step back and appreciate the breathtaking technological developments that
the world has seen, and the difference these developments have made in
terms of saving lives and improving the quality of those lives as societies
begin to get back to normal. As WTO Members did together twenty years
ago when adopting the Doha Declaration, they must continue to acknowledge
the benefits of IP protection for global health, while finding ways to
maximize access to the technologies incentivized by such protection, without
leaving the world unprepared for the next pandemic.
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